INTRODUCTION
The Commander of
Rindam XII/ Tanjungpura Colonel Inf Lucky Avianto instructed his six members to
carry out the task of thickening the third batch of territorial BKO units to
the Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih, Papua.
The task of BKO as a
tour of duty for soldiers was held as an effort to improve their abilities.
Papua became one of the areas for BKO soldiers from various military units to
aim for. In addition to guarding the border areas, they are also involved in
arresting perpetrators of armed criminal groups (KKB). On December 3,
2021, there was a shooting incident at the Preparatory Koramil Post in the
Suru-suru district, as for the damage caused by the incident, two Indonesian
National Armed Forcessoldiers who were fetching water in a holding tank
suffered serious gunshot wounds.
In this incident,
Serda Putra Rahaldi was reported to have died, while on the one hand Praka
Suheri was reported to have suffered a serious gunshot wound to the left hip.
The Armed Criminal Group Movement (KKB) is currently considered no
longer truly voicing the struggle for independence when the Free Papua
Organization (OPM) still existed.
For the Indonesian
National Armed Forcesorganization, the KKB is seen only as a medium for
political interests for a number of parties who do not want Papua to unite with
the Republic of Indonesia. In addition, one of the Papuan women's figures, stated
that the KKB movement's actions were
often followed by the Political Criminal Group Front (KKP) and Clandestine movements by using social media to show their
actions (Meijiko, 2020).
Table 1
A number of shooting in Intan Jaya
|
Date
|
Shooting incident
|
|
19 September 2020
|
Pastor Yeremia
Zanambani died allegedly being shot by Indonesian National Armed Forcesmembers
in a cattle pen near his house in the Hitadipa District.
|
|
October 9, 2020
|
TPNPB-OPM members
shot a member of the joint fact-finding team (TGPF), Bambang Purwoko and a
member of the Indonesian National Armed Forcesin Hitadipa District while
investigating the murder of Pastor Yeremia.
|
|
October 26, 2020
|
Rufinus Tigau,
catechist of the Catholic Church of St. Mikael Biogaia, died after being
involved in a shootout with the Nemangkawi Task Force in Jalai Village,
Sugapa District and Rufinus was accused of being a member of the TPNPB.
|
|
November 6, 2020
|
TPNPB and Indonesian
National Armed Forcesengaged in a gun battle in Titigi Village, Sugapa
District. A member of the Indonesian National Armed Forces, soldier one
Firdaus died in the incident.
|
|
February 25, 2021
|
An Indonesian
National Armed Forcessoldier died in a shootout with TPNPB. This incident
triggered a large-scale deployment of troops by the Indonesian National Armed
Forcesand caused the residents of Intan Jaya to flee to various places.
|
|
February 16, 2021
|
Three youths in
Intan Jaya were allegedly killed by Indonesian National Armed Forcespersonnel
while undergoing treatment at the puskesmas in the district.
|
Source:
newspaper.tempo.co, processed, 2022.
The KKP group often
creates narratives that aim to build a sense of distrust of the Papuan people
to the government in efforts to fulfill the interests of the people
holistically. It should be understood that the current KKB is actually not as big as it used to be and now their group is
in a cornered position. The various forms of terror that they have carried out
are to rebuild their strength and recruit indigenous Papuan youths with school
dropout status and minors to join their groups (mediaindonesia.com, 2021).
The Indonesian
National Armed Forceshas basically succeeded in analyzing and mapping locations
into conflict-prone areas in Papua, including the areas of Intan Jaya,
Hitadipa, Titigi, Sugapa, Mamba, Puncak Jaya Regency and the Central Mountains
of Wamena. The main trigger that became the root of the problem of this long
conflict in Papua, among others, was because it was related to the political
status of Papua's integration into Indonesia.
Other determinant
factors are the level of inequality in the welfare of indigenous Papuans
compared to other regions in Indonesia, the failure of the central government
and local governments in carrying out development programs in Papua, the long
history of the Papuan puppet state that has not been completed and the frequent
resolution of conflicts with weapons operations. The following are some forms
of military operations that the Indonesian National Armed Forceshas carried out
in Papua.
Table 2
Military Operations
in Papua
|
Period
|
Military Operation
|
|
1963 to 1964
|
Operations Wisnu
Murti I and II
|
|
1963 to 1964
|
Operations Wisnu
Murti III and IV, Active and Agile Operations, Awareness
|
|
1966
|
Barathayudha
Operations
|
|
1968
|
Awareness and
Bratayudha Operations, Operations Wibawa
|
|
1970 to 1974
|
Ultimate Operation
|
|
1977 to 1978
|
Operations Along
the Border
|
|
1985 to 1986
|
Operation Crow I
|
|
1986 to 1987
|
Operation Crow II
|
|
1987 to 1989
|
Operation Cassowary
I and II
|
|
1989 to 1991
|
Operation Rajawali
I and II
|
|
1998
|
Armed Forces
Commander General Wiranto apologized and revoked Papua's status as a DOM area
|
|
1998 to 1999
|
Security of
Vulnerable Areas
|
|
1999 to 2002
|
Flag Raising
Control Operation
|
|
2002 to 2004
|
Sweeping Operation
in Wamena
|
Source: Merdeka.com
Research Team, 2022.
Former OPM fighter,
Nick Messet mentioned that the Indonesian government was right in categorizing
the KKB as a terrorist organization
on the basis of the form of its movement that often endangers civil society in
Papua (Webb-Gannon, 2021). Moreover, the
Papuan people generally do not approve of the existence of the KKB in Papua, because the group has
unwittingly or unconsciously created a lot of fear and hatred in the community.
The same thing was
conveyed by Member of Commission I of the DPR, (Mangku, 2022)
supported the discourse on the KKB
which was considered as perpetrators of terrorism with acts of terror, such as
spreading various forms of threats, taking hostage acts, carrying out torture
so that they did not hesitate to injure or kill innocent civilians.
The head of the
Humanitarian Team for the Intan Jaya area as well as an NGO activity for
Lokataru, Haris Azhar and an observer from LIPI, Adriana Elisabeth said that
the various series of armed incidents that occurred in Intan Jaya were
basically inseparable from the interest in controlling natural resources in the
form of commodities. the gold there. In addition, it is also due to the
inability to do so, namely a peaceful dialogue between all parties (bbc.com,
2021).
Researcher from the
Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Pamungkas (2021)
assessed that the work visit carried out by the Indonesian National Armed
ForcesCommander Marshal Hadi Tjahjanto and the National Police Chief General
Lystio Sigit Prabowo to Nemangkari Papua directly would not automatically see
the results immediately.
This is based on the
form and character of the conflict that exists in Papua, not necessarily only
in the form of incidents of political violence, so a forum for dialogue is
needed, namely by holding consultations with Papuan group or community leaders,
traditional leaders and Papuan church leaders and always consider them to be
the same as the nation's children.
Crisis Communication
Crisis communication is an effort to
carry out a dialogue between an organization and its public and stakeholders
before a crisis, during a crisis or after a crisis occurs (Aziz & Wicaksono, 2020). Communication is
key to crisis management. Stakeholders will require information in the event of
a crisis. Information is collected through structured and planned
communication, then processed into knowledge and given to all stakeholders in a
suitable and good manner (Nahar, 2020). The dialogue can
directly contain strategies and practical efforts designed to reduce the value
of damage to the reputation of the organization both morally and materially (Fearn-Banks, 2016). In this case is
for the Indonesian National Armed Forces as the representative of the
Indonesian government in Papua.
Crisis communication can be interpreted
broadly as an effort in the process of collecting, processing, and
disseminating information to overcome crisis situations that are currently
occurring or have occurred (Fearn-Banks, 2016). Moreover,
effective crisis verbal exchange is vital for the successful resolution of
company disaster, verbal exchange is the rather precise employer regions,
because it introduces the penetration of crisis management and company communications
(K�d�rov� et al., 2015). Communication
during a crisis is the most studied way to see how and what an organization
communicates during a crisis to reduce the negative impact of the crisis and is
used to maintain the reputation of the organization.
The existence of a failure to implement
crisis communication in the field can directly make people feel afraid, panic,
and live full of uncertainty and anxiety in dealing with these conditions. For
this reason, the need for citizen involvement during times of crisis is very
important, so that the Indonesian government can find out the insights of
community members about their actions and resilience in responding to crisis
issues while increasing the ability of government institutions to process
crisis information and provide public services (Chen et al., 2020).
SCCT Model Coombs
Situational crisis communication theory
(SCCT) was first proposed by Timothy W. Coombs & Sherry J. Hollday. Then
the study of crisis communication began to develop extensively and
systematically related to researching how people perceive strategies in
responding to a crisis that occurs in society. According to him, the crisis
situation cluster consists of crises that have directly placed organizations as
victims to unintentional crises and crises that can be prevented.
Figure 1. SCCT Coombs
model
Source: Coombs &
Holladay, 2010.
The second core element of Coombs' SCCT
model is used to review how capable the strategy is in responding to crises
that occur in the community. This crisis response strategy is often used to
build or improve the reputation of the organization, reduce negative influences
and prevent the emergence of intentions that can lead to a crisis. Coombs (2021) itself has divided the forms of crisis response into two forms, namely
primary crisis response strategies and secondary crisis response strategies.
Table 3
Crisis Communication
|
Crisis Response
|
Strategies
|
Tactics
|
|
Primary crisis
response strategies
Secondary crisis response strategies
|
a. denial
b. diminish
c. deal
Bolstering
|
�� attack
the accuser
�� denial
�� scapegoat
�� excuse
�� justification
�� concern
�� ingratiation
�� compassion
�� regret
�� apology
�� reminder
�� victimage
�� ingratiation
|
Source: Coombs, 2007;
Coombs & Holladay, 2008 and 2010.
Conflict Transformation
Conflict often involves various forms
of dispute or conflict between two or more parties related to differences in
principles or differences in values or assumptions that are
highly valued by one group. A conflict can basically involve several factors
that determine the emergence of a conflict including social status, power
possessed by a group and non-renewable natural resources.
However, with the existence of several
sources or roots of the conflict, the conflicting parties generally sometimes
appear unnoticed by the disputing parties. Therefore, a clear explanation
regarding the root causes of conflict is more likely to be in the form of
multiple arguments rather than just one argument (Fox, 2009).
However, if analyzed more deeply, there
are several forms or characteristics of a conflict that can be identified,
including consisting of two or more parties involved in the conflict; they are
often involved in an act that is mutually hostile between one party and
another.
They often use violent actions that
ultimately aim to destroy other parties that are against their interests, hurt
those who are considered to have different views with their group and tend to
hinder the interests of their opponents; and conflicting and open-ended
interaction patterns, so that they can be clearly detected by independent
observers outside the disputing group (Francis, 2002).
Conflicts generally often involve
various actors such as antagonists created in conflicts or conflicts of
interest, those who have great influence or authority including proponents of
various attitudes, processes and outcomes that arise from conflict; and
liaisons and mediators (also including arms dealers, black market actors and
extortionists, provocateurs and also those who are included as agitators who
often manipulate a conflict for their personal and group interests (Francis, 2002).
Conflict transformation as a dream and
an effort in responding to the ups and downs of a social conflict that occurs
in society and as an opportunity given by life to create a process of
constructive social change, where it can reduce The level of violence that
occurs increases a sense of justice in a direct interaction and social
structure, including responding to human problems in relation to human
relations (Lederach, 2015).
METHOD
The researcher uses a qualitative
research method (Creswell & Poth, 2016). Furthermore, ase
study research method is where the researcher conducts an in-depth exploration
of the program, event, process, activity, against one or more people (Sugiyono, 2016). A case study
approach was applied, �to raises problems
in the field related to the communication crisis strategy as a solution to
bridge the peace agreement between Kopasus and OPM in West Papua. As for data
sources, researchers used secondary data with interactive analysis techniques.
Figure 3. Research
Analysis Design
Source: Miles,
Huberman & Saldana (2018).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2011), states that there
are several main contributing factors that are the root cause of the emergence
of the KKB conflict in Papua, including the following:
1.
The history of the integration of Papua
in Indonesia which was carried out through the activities of the referendum on
the determination of the people's opinion (Papera) in 1969 which indicated that
there was fraud committed by the Indonesian government because it was
considered by some parties that it was not in accordance with the contents of
the New York agreement, namely one man one vote.
2.
Violations of human rights committed by
the Indonesian government and the state security apparatus that continue to
this day.
3.
Various forms of treatment that are not
in accordance with the principles of humanity, namely the attitude of
marginalization and discrimination against indigenous Papuans whose patterns
continue to increase.
4.
The failure of social order
infrastructure development that occurs in the midst of the Papuan people, such
as the lack of public health facilities, low and unequal education and the
economic value of the indigenous Papuan people who are far from welfare.
On the other hand, the role of the Commission for Disappeared Persons
and Victims of Violence (KontraS) and Imparsial as well as a number of civil
society organizations in the Papuan community argue that they deeply regret the
actions of the Indonesian government in the defense and security sector in
responding to the security situation that occurred in Papua. Papua, whose
frequency often results in many casualties from indigenous Papuan civilians.
The Indonesian government is also considered to have often made
decisions that are contradictory in nature with the reduction of INDONESIAN
NATIONAL ARMED FORCESor Polri troops and have created a discourse for the
redefinition of the KKB and TPN-OPM as terrorist organizations in Papua.
In fact, this step is considered to be still strong in the view of the
Government of Indonesia regarding the securitization of Papua. So that the
Indonesian government is not only considered to have failed to see and
understand the real root causes of the conflict in Papua, but also has
indirectly paved the way for the military regarding the use of a military
security approach in its resolution. This has become more frequent since the
racism incident that occurred in Surabaya in 2019, when the Indonesian
government responded with holistic security measures.
At first the Indonesian government made efforts to slow down which then
blocked access to internet use in Papua, but along with that, divisions and
violence occurred in several places, so the Indonesian government sent an
additional number of humanitarian personnel. With the lack of clarity about the
military operations present in Papua, the reduction in the number of Indonesian
National Armed Forces and Polri troops is an issue that cannot be answered by
the Indonesian government on the pretext of a personnel exchange policy in
Papua.
With the decrease in the number of Indonesian National Armed Forces and
Polri troops, it is not known the exact number of personnel, the number and placement
of the territory. This reduction or withdrawal of personnel in Papua is carried
out in order to reduce and suppress the level of conflict which in fact has not
been able to answer the humanitarian problems that have been occurring in the
Papua region.
Basically, the authority and responsibility in terms of deploying Indonesian
National Armed Forces forces within the framework of implementing Military
Operations Other than War (OMSP) rests with the President while still taking
into account the considerations of the DPR (state political decisions) as
explained in Article 7 paragraphs (2) and (3) Law Number 34 of 2004 concerning
the Indonesian National Army.
This is also reinforced by Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2008 concerning
the General Policy of National Defense which emphasizes that efforts to
mobilize Indonesian National Armed Forces in the implementation of OMSP must be
carried out based on political decisions by the Indonesian government. On the
basis of these provisions, the implementation of the deployment of Indonesian
National Armed Forces in Papua and its involvement in various forms of OMSP
operations if there is no basis for the underlying state political policy and
moreover it is carried out excessively, then clearly it can violate the provisions
of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Law.
DISCUSSION
A.
The Main Context of Papua
The area of Papua is 421,981 km2 or 3.5 times
larger than the island of Java and topographically it consists of mountainous
areas in the middle and extensive swampy areas along the coast. Papua's
territorial boundaries consist of the Halmahera and Pacific seas in the north,
the Arafura and Australian seas in the south, Papua New Guinea in the east and
the Seram and Maluku seas in the west. The total population of Papua is around
2,576,822 people, which is only 1% of the total population of Indonesia.
In Papua there are as many as 70% of those who live in villages and
remote mountainous areas in the center of the island of Papua (Yanuarti,
2016). The topology of this area is confirmed by the results of an
anthropological field study (FOS), which identifies seven cultural zones
throughout Papua, namely Saireri, Doberai, Bomberai, Ha-Anim, Tani, Lano-Pahp
and Me-Pago. There are more than 250 ethnic groups with different distributions
of indigenous customs, languages, practices and beliefs in Papua.
In other words, there are as many as
hundreds of customary norms that apply in this province, moreover there are as
many as 100 different non-Papuan ethnic groups also here. The influence of the
entity is still very strong, this is why every incident that often occurs shows
a certain disregard for social harmony which is usually very unfortunate
followed by acts of violence. On the one hand, the conflict arises in a
situation where the Indonesian government is considered to have failed to
understand the condition of the plurality of norms and values in
Papua.
In addition to its extraordinary
cultural wealth, the Papua region also has abundant natural resources such as
natural resources in the form of gas, oil, gold, silver, marine products and
copper. However, ironically, the abundance of natural resources, both natural
and cultural resources, has been tainted by a long history of social conflicts
involving enormous handling costs and significant human casualties in each
conflict.
Since the proclamation of Indonesian
independence in 1945, the Dutch government has separated the territory of Papua
from the Indies, this was done in order to prepare the territory of Papua and
its inhabitants for a self-government that was not related to the Dutch
government. In addition, in the 10-year development plan drawn up by the Dutch
government in 1950, the UNTEA (Interim Administration of the United Nations)
organization was judged to be responsible for the political transition in
Papua.
Therefore, on December 1, 1961 several
steps were taken in preparation for the preparation that gained important
momentum, namely from the Dutch government in setting the number of elected
local community members in Papua as 50% of the Nieuw Guinea Raad (legislature).
In addition, the Morning Star flag was flown side by side with the Dutch flag
and the Papuan national anthem �Hai Tanahku Papua) began to be used in general
and was introduced to all members of the United Nations.
However, basically the New York
Agreement of 1962 did not involve indigenous Papuans and the contents of the
agreement were designed as a frame of reference for the transfer of the
government of Nederland Nieuw Guinea (Papua) from the Netherlands to the
Indonesian government. The impact was that in 1964, some indigenous Papuan
elites who were educated in the Netherlands demanded that Papuan (government)
be free not only from the Dutch government but also from the Indonesian
government.
The United Nations-approved free-choice
voting activity was carried out in 1969, involving more than 1,000 elected
tribal leaders (out of an estimated population of 800,000). This is an impact
as evidence of consultation because the absence of Papuan involvement in
decision-making which actually affects their living conditions and existence.
This has unknowingly and indirectly
left a bad trail in the form of historical complaints that arise from various
differences in perceptions about efforts to integrate the Papua region into the
Indonesian state government. This condition is the basis because throughout
history how the indigenous Papuan people interacted with Indonesia were not
critically deconstructed and open to identify a shared history, so that
historical complaints will still exist.
B. Polarization
Polarization both horizontally, namely between indigenous Papuans and
vertically, namely between the Indonesian government and the indigenous
Papuans, has unknowingly created a widening gap that can exacerbate the
conditions and impacts of conflict. One of them is the element that triggers
this polarization, namely the difference in perceptions of what constitutes a
genuine cultural identity compared to a sense of nationalism as a nation and
state.
There are several forms of open conflict and acts of violence caused by
the raising of the Morning Star flag which are considered and considered as a
form of manifestation of separatism efforts. Furthermore, the condition of
public opinion that has developed in the community has become more polarized
and divided this is due to a pervasive sense of militarism, so that the result
indirectly is a worrying paramilitary formation of the red and white line
consisting of civilians who see themselves as defenders of the Indonesian
state.
The existence of polarization at both the micro and local levels in
Papua is the impact of various policies imposed by the Central Government in
Papua. At that time, President Megawati Soekarnoputri, had issued Inpres
(Presidential Instruction) No. 01/2003 concerning the Expansion of Papua and
the Birth of the Province of West Irian Jaya. The impact of this policy is that
it has indirectly polarized groups in Papua, namely there are groups that
support and groups that oppose it.
The policy groups who are pro with the division of authority assess and
argue that the policy is one of the strategic steps planned by the Indonesian
government to ensure that more public services can be provided by the
Indonesian government for local communities and greater welfare for indigenous
people in Papua. .
On November 4, 2004, the Constitutional Court had implicitly recognized
the status of the Province of West Irian Jaya, which was subsequently carried
out by the DPRD of West Irian Jaya Province to hold a public consultation and
further support for efforts to establish the Province of West Irian Jaya. On
the other hand, anti-Papua expansion policy groups consider and argue that the
legal product in the form of Presidential Instruction No.01/2003 is no longer
in line with the legal product of Law No.21/2001 on Otsus Papua, especially in
paragraph 76 which stipulates that the formation of a new province must obtain
approval from the DPRP and MRP.
However, the MRP at that time had not yet been formed when the
Presidential Instruction No. 01/2003 was issued. The impact was that the public
consultations carried out by the MRP came to the opposite conclusion, namely
the emergence of the policy for the expansion of the Papua region including the
birth of the Province of West Irian Jaya which was too early and any direct
expansion policy had to be in line with the contents of paragraph 76 of Law No.
21/ 2001. The indirect impact is that both the DPRP and the MRP now reject the
existence of the West Irian Jaya Province. On the one hand, the DPRP has also
issued another legal product, namely in the form of an official decision
No.05/DPRP/2006 on 17 February 2006 which was drafted to support the recommendations
of the MRP.
C.
Local Actors
In the concept of implementing the special autonomy framework,
indigenous peoples who are at the grassroots become the main target, both as
beneficiaries and actors of progress on their land. Therefore, full attention
must be paid to that level, namely to give them sufficient space in determining
the social progress desired by the community and directing it towards positive
peace.
Informal leaders such as tribal chiefs have a role in ensuring peaceful
coexistence in their communities. Existing people still listen to and obey
tribal leaders who are respected among grassroots individuals. As for the form
of tribal loyalty as part of primordialism which still determines the
relationship between indigenous Papuans and becomes their collective identity
as indigenous Papuan children.
On the one hand, charismatic tribal leaders indirectly have the
traditional authority to influence and even mobilize their communities in some
cases. This becomes a sensitive issue when this form of primordialism is
exploited by several conflict entrepreneurs who are trying to change this form
of loyalty into ethnic politics in the Papua region.
Therefore, it is important for all parties to be aware of and understand
the context of the crisis in which tribal leaders must be able to act and not
see their position as objects that can be manipulated and this will certainly
enable them to make an active and positive contribution to Papua.
In the context of the conflict issue in Papua, civil society
organizations (CSOs) consisting of religious organizations and traditional
organizations, even NGOs, media and educational institutions exist. Religious
organizations from various denominations of religious beliefs namely
Protestantism, Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism as well as their
leaders who have been directly involved actively by making practical input and
coordinating various existing initiatives with efforts to achieve positive
peace in the Papua region.
Since 2003, many religious leaders have identified, developed and
promoted the concept of PTD or Papua Land of Peace as a form of reference used
to critically analyze the concrete development process in Papua.
They considered that the MRP organization as a form of representation of
the cultural values of the indigenous Papuan people should not be
involved in the dynamics of local politics in Papua. Therefore, in fact the MRP
organization has a tendency to take on some political character, religious
leaders who are reluctant to join or refuse to be part of the MRP members and
do not decide to set quotas for representatives of religious communities in
Papua.
However, in practice they remain actively involved by providing several
inputs to many parties in Papua regarding how to initiate dialogue and develop
a sense of togetherness as well as how to avoid human costs in the process of
resolving various security and order conflicts in Papua. In addition to
religious leaders, there are also several sections of church institutions such
as the SKP or the Secretariat of Justice and Peace that are directly active in
the peace building process and issues related to human rights.
Another issue is whether or not there is representation of indigenous
Papuan indigenous peoples, namely that there are two main organizations
directly affiliated with indigenous Papuans, namely the PDP or the Presidium of
the Papuan Council, whose main purpose of its formation was to engage in
politics and was widely known, especially when its leader, They Eluay was
assassinated. The second customary affiliation organization is DAP, which was
established by members of indigenous indigenous peoples from all Papuan
communities.
As for the form of integration and harmonization among the many social
institutions of indigenous local communities in Papua which directly work on
various discourses or subjects, namely those related to human rights,
education, health, culture, gender, populist economy and so on, which are
needed to build a network that is effectively based on a common concept. This
is because they have clear original ideas and various forms of programs that
are based on local needs and interests of indigenous Papuans and do not follow
the agenda of other organizations or donors.
D.
Local Government
Referring to Law No. 34/2004 concerning regional head elections, it is
stated that regional heads are directly elected by the people. The
democratization process must be able to go hand in hand with an increase in
education and political understanding which is expected to enable the community
to analyze and express their choices critically.
Meanwhile, good governance can directly play a key role in efforts to
achieve positive peace in Papua. If not, then the aspired democracy will not
function as expected and lose to the dirty practice of primordialism. Unless
this is followed up with outward-looking policies and seeks to build trust in
others as well as improve proper education for the community and direct
community elections, such as Papua by only opening channels for Papuanization
based on building an attitude of tribal loyalty that triggers horizontal
conflicts.
CONCLUSION
Building good communication in the midst of a crisis
situation requires a high effort and commitment from the disputing parties in
their respective interests. Conflict transformation can be used as a scientific
approach in crisis communication situations, starting from the transformation
process where the government must provide space for community groups in Papua
to express their aspirations as well as include their involvement in creating
good communication towards a mutually beneficial solution for both parties.
Then the next effort, followed by personnel transformation, namely an effort to
eliminate negative thoughts or bad traits in the form of old grudges or the
unwillingness of one party to accept the other.
Peace will be created if both parties eliminate old
hostility and grudges, because with an attitude of openness to accept the
presence of other community groups, it will facilitate efforts to establish
security and order in the community. The next approach is to use a structural
transformation, namely by making a peace agreement that can be seen from the
creation of legal products that bind the rights and obligations of both parties
in achieving peace. This requires a high commitment from both parties, on the
one hand being obedient to carry out the peace agreement and on the one hand
restraining behavior that destroys peace.
The transformation of relations aims to strengthen the
efforts of both parties to achieve the goal of peace. Finally, cultural
transformation is a joint effort to be more aware and instill the principle
that the decision to go to war or engage in a ceasefire will only keep both
parties away from peace efforts. In addition, the existence of a culture of
hostility will actually worsen the security situation in the community and
appear not only innocent people, but also victims and losses from both material
and immaterial.
In addition, it is recommended that the social psychology
approach be prioritized compared to the other two approaches, namely the legal
approach and the social approach. This is done in order to suppress the
emergence of community trauma from old wounds and minimize the negative impact
of personal transformation, namely a sense of revenge or unwillingness to
accept other groups that are different from their own.
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